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ABSTRACT
State-of-the-art important passage retrieval methods obtain
very good results, but do not take into account privacy is-
sues. In this paper, we present a privacy preserving method
that relies on creating secure representations of documents.
Our approach allows for third parties to retrieve important
passages from documents without learning anything regard-
ing their content. We use a hashing scheme known as Se-
cure Binary Embeddings to convert a key phrase and bag-
of-words representation to bit strings in a way that allows
the computation of approximate distances, instead of exact
ones. Experiments show that our secure system yield simi-
lar results to its non-private counterpart on both clean text
and noisy speech recognized text.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.3 [Information Storage and Retrieval]; I.2.7 [Natural
Language Processing]: Text analysis; K.4.1 [Computers
and Society]: Public Policy Issues—privacy
General Terms
Algorithms, Experimentation
Keywords
Secure Passage Retrieval, Important Passage Retrieval, KP-
Centrality, Secure Binary Embeddings, Data Privacy, Auto-
matic Key Phrase Extraction
1. INTRODUCTION
Important Passage Retrieval (IPR) is the problem of ex-
tracting the most important passages in a body of text. By
“important”, we mean those passages that capture most of
the key information the text is attempting to convey. Of
the various solutions proposed, state-of-the-art solutions for
IPR based on centrality achieve excellent results [24].
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A potential problem to the deployment of such methods
is that they usually assume that the input data are of public
domain. However, this data may come from social network
profiles, medical records or other private documents, and
their owners may not want to, or even be allowed to share it
with third parties. Consider the scenario where a company
has millions of classified documents. The company needs to
retrieve the most important passages from those documents,
but lacks the computational power or know-how to do so. At
the same time, they can not give access to the documents to
a third party with such capabilities because they may con-
tain sensitive information. As a result, the company must
obfuscate their own data before sending it to the third party,
a requirement that is seemingly at odds with the objective
of extracting important passages from it.
In this paper, we propose a new privacy-preserving tech-
nique for IPR based on Secure Binary Embeddings (SBE) [3]
that enables exactly this – it provides a mechanism for ob-
fuscating the data, while still achieving near state-of-the-art
performance in IPR.
SBEs are a form of locality-sensitive hashing which con-
vert data arrays such as bag-of-words vectors to obfuscated
bit strings through a combination of random projections fol-
lowed by banded quantization. The method has information
theoretic guarantees of security, ensuring that the original
data cannot be recovered from the bit strings. At the same
time, they also provide a mechanism for locally computing
distances between vectors that are close to one another with-
out revealing the global geometry of the data, consequently
enabling tasks such as IPR. This is possible because, un-
like other hashing methods which require exact matches for
performing classification tasks, SBEs allows for a near-exact
matching: the hashes can be used to estimate the distances
between vectors that are very close, but provably provide no
information whatsoever about the distance between vectors
that are farther apart. The usefulness of SBE has already
been shown for implementing a privacy-preserving speaker
verification system [21] yielding promising results.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In
Section 2 we briefly present some related work regarding Im-
portant Passage Retrieval and privacy-preserving methods
in IR. In Section 3 we detail the two stages of the important
passage retrieval technique. Section 4 presents the method
for obtaining a secure representation method. We describe
our approach to privacy-preserving important passage re-
trieval in Section 5. Section 6 describes the dataset used and
illustrates our approach with some experiments. Finally, we
present some conclusions and plans for future work.
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2. RELATEDWORK
2.1 Important Passage Retrieval
Text and speech information sources influence the com-
plexity of the important passage retrieval approaches dif-
ferently. For textual passage retrieval, it is common to use
complex information, such as syntactic [30], semantic [28],
and discourse information [29], either to assess relevance
or reduce the length of the output. However, speech im-
portant passage retrieval approaches have an extra layer of
complexity, caused by speech-related issues like recognition
errors or disfluencies. As a result, it is useful to use speech-
specific information (e.g.: acoustic/prosodic features [15],
recognition confidence scores [33]), or by improving both the
assessment of relevance and the intelligibility of automatic
speech recognizer transcriptions (by using related informa-
tion [23]). These problems not only increase the difficulty
in determining the salient information, but also constrain
the applicability of passage retrieval techniques to speech
passage retrieval. Nevertheless, shallow text summarization
approaches such as Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA) [9] and
Maximal Marginal Relevance (MMR) [4] seem to achieve
performances comparable to the ones using specific speech-
related features [20]. In addition, discourse features start to
gain some importance in speech retrieval [15, 35].
Closely related to the important passage retrieval used by
this work are approaches using the unsupervised key phrase
extraction methods. These methods are used to reinforce
passage retrieval [34, 31, 11, 25, 27]. Namely, they propose
the use of key phrases to summarize news articles [11] and
meetings [25]. In [11], the authors explored both supervised
and unsupervised methods with a limited set of features to
extract key phrases as a first step towards important passage
retrieval. Furthermore, the important passage retrieval used
in this work adapts the centrality retrieval model, which
plays an important role in the whole process. This kind of
model adaptation is explored in [25], where the first stage of
their method consists in a simple key phrase extraction step,
based on part-of-speech patterns; then, these key phrases are
used to define the relevance and redundancy components of
a MMR summarization model.
Most of the IPR methods could be easily adapted to be
secure using the method described in Section 4. We opted to
use the KP-Centrality method described in the next section
because it has the current state-of-the-art IPR method.
2.2 Privacy Preserving Methods
In this work, we focused on creating a method to perform
important passage retrieval keeping the information in the
original documents private. There is a large body of litera-
ture on important passage retrieval and privacy preserving
or secure methods. To the best of our knowledge, the com-
bination of both research lines has not been explored yet.
However, there are some recent works combining informa-
tion retrieval and privacy. Most of these works use data
encryption [8, 17, 7, 12] to transfer the data in a secure way.
This does not solve our problem because the content of the
document would be decrypted by the retrieval method and
therefore it would not remain confidential to the retrieval
method. Another alternative secure information retrieval
methodology is to obfuscate queries, which hides user topi-
cal intention [19], but does not secure documents content.
In many areas the interest in privacy-preserving methods
where two or more parties are involved and they wish to
jointly perform a given operation without disclosing their
private information is not new, and several techniques such
as Garbled Circuits [32], Homomorphic Encryption [18], Lo-
cality-Sensitive Hashing [6] have been introduced. However,
they all have limitations regarding the Important Passage
Retrieval task we wish to address. Until recently Garbled
Circuits were extremely inefficient to use due to several in-
trinsic issues, and even now it is difficult to adapt them when
the computation of non-linear operations is required. Solu-
tions to many of these problems have been developed, such
as performing offline computation of the oblivious trans-
fers, using shorter ciphers, evaluating XOR gates for ’free’,
etc. [1]. Systems based on Homomorphic Encryption tech-
niques introduce substantial amounts of computational over-
head and usually require extremely long amounts of time
to evaluate any function of interest. The Locality-Sensitive
Hashing technique allows for near-exact match detection be-
tween data points, but does not provide any actual notion
of distance, leading to degradation of performance in some
applications. As a result, we decided to consider Secure
Binary Embeddings [3] as the data privacy method for our
approach, as it does not show any of the disadvantages men-
tioned above for the task at hand. We describe this tech-
nique in depth in Section 4.
3. IMPORTANT PASSAGE RETRIEVAL
To determine the most important sentences of an infor-
mation source, we used the KP-Centrality model [24]. We
chose this model for its adaptability to different types of in-
formation sources (e.g., text, audio and video) and state-of-
the-art performance. It is based on the notion of combining
key phrases with support sets. A support set is a group
of the most semantically related passages. These semantic
passages are selected using heuristics based on the passage
order method [22]. This type of heuristic explore the struc-
ture of the input source to partition the candidate passages
to be included in the support set in two subsets: the ones
closer to the passage associated with the support set under
construction and the ones further apart. These heuristics
use a permutation, di1, d
i
2, · · · , diN−1, of the distances of the
passages sk to the passage pi, related to the support set un-
der construction, with dik = dist(sk, pi), 1 ≤ k ≤ N − 1,
where N is the number of passages, corresponding to the
order of occurrence of passages sk in the input source. The
metric that is normally used is the cosine distance.
The KP-Centrality method consists of two steps, as il-
lustrated in Figure 1. First, it extracts key phrases using
a supervised approach [13] and combines them with a bag-
of-words model in a compact matrix representation, given
by:w(t1, p1) . . . w(t1, pN ) w(t1, k1) . . . w(t1, kM )... ...
w(tT , p1) . . . w(tT , pN ) w(tT , k1) . . . w(tT , kM )
 ,
(1)
where w is a function of the number of occurrences of term ti
in passage pj or key phrase kl, T is the number of terms and
M is the number of key phrases. Then, using a segmented
information source I , p1, p2, . . . , pN , a support set Si is
computed for each passage pi using:
Si , {s ∈ I ∪K : sim(s, pi) > εi ∧ s 6= pi}, (2)
Key Phrases 
+ 
Bag-of-words
(matrix representation)
Document Important Passages
Support Sets
 + 
Ranking
Figure 1: Flowchart of the Important Passage Retrieval method.
Figure 2: 1-bit quantization functions.
for i = 1, . . . , N+M . Passages are ranked excluding the key
phrases K (artificial passages) according to:
arg max
s∈(∪ni=1Si)−K
∣∣{Si : s ∈ Si}∣∣. (3)
4. SECURE BINARY EMBEDDINGS
A Secure Binary Embedding (SBE) is a scheme that con-
verts real-valued vectors to bit sequences using band-quan-
tized random projections. These bit sequences, which we
will refer to as hashes, possess an interesting property: if
the Euclidean distance between two vectors is lower than a
threshold, then the Hamming distance between their hashes
is proportional to the Euclidean distance between the vec-
tors; if it is higher, then the hashes provide no informa-
tion about the true distance between the two vectors. This
scheme relies on the concept of Universal Quantization [2],
which redefines scalar quantization by forcing the quantiza-
tion function to have non-contiguous quantization regions.
Given an L-dimensional vector x ∈ RL, the universal
quantization process converts it to anM -bit binary sequence,
where the m-th bit is given by
qm(x) = Q
( 〈x,am〉+ wm
∆
)
. (4)
Here 〈, 〉 represents a dot product. am ∈ RL is a projection
vector comprising L i.i.d. samples drawn fromN (µ = 0, σ2),
∆ is a precision parameter, and wm is a random dither drawn
from a uniform distribution over [0,∆]. Q(·) is a quantiza-
tion function given by Q(x) = bx mod 2c. We can represent
the complete quantization into M bits compactly in vector
form:
q(x) = Q
(
∆−1(Ax + w)
)
, (5)
where q(x) is an M -bit binary vector, which we will refer to
as the hash of x. A ∈ RM×L is a matrix composed of the
row vectors am, ∆ is a diagonal matrix with entries ∆, and
w ∈ RM is a vector composed from the dither values wm.
The universal 1-bit quantizer of Equation 4 maps the real
line onto 1/0 in a banded manner, where each band is ∆m
wide. Figure 2 compares conventional scalar 1-bit quantiza-
tion (left panel) with the equivalent universal 1-bit quanti-
zation (right panel).
The binary hash generated by the Universal Quantizer of
Equation 5 has the following properties [3]: the probabil-
Figure 3: SBE behavior as a function of ∆, for two
values of M .
ity that the ith bits, qi(x) and qi(x
′) respectively, of hashes
of two vectors x and x′ are identical depends only on the
Euclidean distance dE = ‖x − x′‖ between the vectors and
not on their actual values. As a consequence, the follow-
ing relationship can be shown [3]: given any two vectors
x and x′ with a Euclidean distance dE , with probability
at most e−2t
2M the normalized (per-bit) Hamming distance
dH(q(x),q(x
′)) between the hashes of x and x′ is bounded
by:
1
2
−1
2
e
−
(
piσdE√
2∆
)2
−t ≤ dH(q(x),q(x′)) ≤ 1
2
− 4
pi2
e
−
(
piσdE√
2∆
)2
+t,
(6)
where t is the control factor. The above bound means
that the Hamming distance dH(q(x),q(x
′)) is correlated to
the Euclidean distance dE between the two vectors, if dE is
lower than a threshold (which depends on ∆). Specifically,
for small dE , E[dH(q(x),q(x
′))], the expected Hamming
distance, can be shown to be bounded by
√
2pi−1σ∆−1dE ,
which is linear in dE . However, if the distance between x
and x′ is higher than this threshold, then dH(q(x),q(x′)) is
bounded by 0.5−4pi−2exp (−0.5pi2σ2∆−2d2E), which rapidly
converges to 0.5 and effectively gives us no information what-
soever about the true distance between x and x′.
In order to illustrate how this scheme works, we ran-
domly generated pairs of vectors in a high-dimensional space
(L = 1024) and plotted the normalized Hamming distance
between their hashes against the Euclidean distance between
them (Figure 3). The number of bits in the hash is also
shown in the figures.
We note that in all cases, once the normalized distance ex-
ceeds ∆, the Hamming distance between the hashes of two
vectors ceases to provide any information about the true dis-
tance between the vectors. We will find this property useful
in developing our privacy-preserving system. Changing the
value of the precision parameter ∆ allows us to adjust the
distance threshold until which the Hamming distance is in-
formative. Increasing the number of bits M leads to a reduc-
tion of the variance of the Hamming distance. A converse
property of the embeddings is that for all x′ except those
that lie within a small radius of any x, dH(q(x),q(x
′)) pro-
vides little information about how close x′ is to x. It can
be shown that the embedding provides information theoretic
security beyond this radius, if the embedding parameters A
and w are unknown to the potential eavesdropper. Any al-
gorithm attempting to recover a signal x from its embedding
q(x) or to infer anything about the relationship between two
signals sufficiently far apart using only their embeddings will
fail to do so. Furthermore, even in the case where A and w
are known, it seems computationally intractable to derive x
from q(x) unless one can guess a starting point very close to
x. In effect, it is infeasible to invert the SBE without strong
a priori assumptions about x.
5. SECURE IMPORTANT PASSAGE
RETRIEVAL
Our approach for a privacy-preserving important passage
retrieval system closely follows the formulation presented in
Section 3, and it is illustrated in Figure 4. However, this is
a very important difference in terms of who performs each
of the steps. Typically there is only one party involved, Al-
ice, who owns the original documents, performs key phrase
extraction, combines them with the bag-of-words model in a
compact matrix representation, computes the support sets
for each documents and finally uses to retrieve the impor-
tant passages. In our scenario, Alice does not know how to
extract the important passages from them or does not pos-
sess the computational power to do so. Therefore, she must
outsource the retrieval process to a third-party, Bob, who
has these capabilities. However, Alice must first obfuscate
the information contained in the compact matrix representa-
tion. If Bob receives this information as is, he could use the
term frequencies to infer on the contents of the original doc-
uments and gain access to private or classified information
Alice does not wish to disclosure to anyone. Alice computes
binary hashes of her compact matrix representation using
the method described in Section 4, keeping the randomiza-
tion parameters A and w to herself. She sends these hashes
to Bob, who computes the support sets and extracts the
important passages. Because Bob receives binary hashes in-
stead of the original matrix representation, he must use the
normalized Hamming distance instead of the cosine distance
in this step, since it is the metric the SBE hashes best re-
late to. Finally, we returns the hashes corresponding to the
important passages to Alice, who then uses them to get the
information she desires.
6. EXPERIMENTS
In this section we illustrate the performance of our privacy-
preserving approach to Important Passage Retrieval and
how it compares to its non-private counterpart. We start
by presenting the datasets we used in our experiments, then
we describe the experimental setup and finally we present
some results.
6.1 Datasets
In order to evaluate our approach, we performed experi-
ments on the English version of the Concisus dataset [26] and
the Portuguese Broadcast News (PT BN) dataset [23]. The
Concisus dataset is composed by seventy eight event reports
and respective summaries, distributed across three different
Metric ROUGE-1
Cosine distance 0.575
Euclidean distance 0.507
Table 1: KP-Centrality results with 40 key phrases
using the Concisus dataset.
Metric ROUGE-1
Cosine distance 0.612
Euclidean distance 0.590
Table 2: KP-Centrality results with 40 key phrases
using the Portuguese Broadcast News dataset.
types of events: aviation accidents, earthquakes, and train
accidents. This corpus also contains comparable data in
Spanish. However, since our Automatic Key Phrase Extrac-
tion (AKE) system uses some language-dependent features,
we opted for not using in this part of the dataset in previous
work [24] nor in this one.
The PT BN dataset consists of automatic transcriptions
of eighteen broadcast news stories in European Portuguese,
which are part of a news program. News stories cover several
generic topics like society, politics and sports, among others.
For each news story, there is a human-produced abstract,
used as reference.
6.2 Setup
We extracted key phrases from both datasets using the
MAUI toolkit [16] expanded with shallow semantic features,
such as number of named entities, part-of-speech tags and
four n-gram domain model probabilities. This expanded fea-
ture set leads to improvements regarding the quality of the
key phrases. Regarding the Concisus dataset, we extracted
yet additional features, such as the detection of rhetorical
devices, which further improved the key phrase extraction
process [13]. As for the PT BN dataset, we only used the
shallow semantic features as the remaining features were not
available [14].
6.3 Results
We present some baseline experiments in order to obtain
reference values for our approach. We generated three pas-
sages summaries for Concisus Dataset, which are commonly
found in online news web sites like Google News. In the ex-
periments using the PT BN dataset, the summary size was
determined by the size of the reference human summaries,
which consisted in about 10% of the input news story. For
both experiments, we used the Cosine and the Euclidean dis-
tance as evaluation metrics, since the first is the usual metric
for computing textual similarity, but the second is the one
that relates to the Secured Binary Embeddings technique.
All results are presented in terms of ROUGE [10], in par-
ticular ROUGE-1, which is the most widely used evaluation
measure for this scenario. The results we obtained for the
Concisus and the PT BN datasets are presented in Tables 1
and 2, respectively.
We considered forty key phrases in our experiments since
it is the usual choice when news articles are considered [13].
As expected, we notice some slight degradation when the
Euclidean distance is considered, but we still achieve better
results than other state-of-the-art methods such as default
centrality [22] and LexRank [5]. Reported results in the
Key Phrases 
+ 
Bag-of-words
(matrix representation)
Secure Binary 
EmbeddingsDocument
Important 
Passages
Support Sets
 + 
Ranking
Figure 4: Flowchart of the Secure Important Passage Retrieval method.
leakage ∼ 5% ∼ 25% ∼ 50% ∼ 75% ∼ 95%
bpc=4 0.365 0.437 0.465 0.486 0.495
bpc=8 0.424 0.384 0.436 0.452 0.500
bpc=16 0.384 0.416 0.450 0.463 0.517
Table 3: KP-Centrality using SBE and the Concisus
dataset, in terms of ROUGE-1.
leakage ∼ 5% ∼ 25% ∼ 50% ∼ 75% ∼ 95%
bpc=4 0.314 0.340 0.470 0.478 0.562
bpc=8 0.327 0.324 0.486 0.507 0.527
bpc=16 0.338 0.336 0.520 0.473 0.550
Table 4: KP-Centrality using SBE and the Por-
tuguese Broadcast News dataset, in terms of
ROUGE-1.
literature include ROUGE-1 = 0.443 and 0.531 using default
Centrality and ROUGE-1 = 0.428 and 0.471 using LexRank
for the Concisus and PT BN datasets, respectively [24]. This
means that the forced change of metric due to the intrinsic
properties of SBE does not affect the validity of our approach
in any way.
For our privacy-preserving approach we performed exper-
iments using different values for the SBE parameters. The
results we obtained in terms of ROUGE for the Concisus
and the PT BN datasets are presented in Tables 3 and 4, re-
spectively. Leakage refers to the fraction of SBE hashes for
which the normalized Hamming distance dH is proportional
to the Euclidean distance dE between the original data vec-
tors. The amount of leakage is exclusively controlled by ∆.
Bits per coefficient (bpc) is the ratio between the number
of measurements M and the dimensionality of the original
data vectors L, i.e., bpc = M/L. As expected, increasing
the amount of leakage (i.e. increasing ∆) leads to improv-
ing the retrieval results. Surprisingly, changing the values
of bpc does not lead to improved performance. The reason
for this results might be due to the KP-Centrality method
using support sets that consider multiple partial representa-
tions of the documents. Nevertheless, the most significant
results is that for 95% leakage there is an almost negligible
loss of performance. This scenario, however, does not vio-
late our privacy requisites in any way, since although most
of the distances between hashes are known, there is no way
to use this information to learn anything about the original
underlying information.
7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
In this work, we introduced a privacy-preserving technique
for performing Important Passage Retrieval that performs
similarly to their non-private counterpart. Our Secure Bi-
nary Embeddings based approach provides secure document
representations that allows for sensitive information to be
processed by third parties without any risk of sensitive in-
formation disclosure. Although there was some slight degra-
dation of results regarding the baseline, our approach still
outperforms other state-of-the-art methods like default Cen-
trality and LexRank, but with important advantage that no
private or classified information is disclosed to third parties.
For future work we intend to use the secure representation
based on Secure Binary Embeddings in multi-document im-
portant passage retrieval. Another additional research line
that we would like to purse is to apply this privacy preserv-
ing technique in other Information Retrieval tasks, such as
classified military and medical records retrieval.
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